Archive for January 2007

The California No Spanking/Abortion Hypocrisy

January 22, 2007

The California No Spanking/Abortion Hypocrisy

Assemblywoman Sally Lieber, D-Mountain View, recently announced that she is drafting a bill to outlaw the spanking of children up to 3 years old. Reportedly according to the Mercury News, “[f]or the record, she does not have children and says she was not slapped as a child.” Now if we applied the Senator Barbara Boxer’s “Rice Standard”, Assemblywoman Lieber is not qualified to draft a bill which deals with children.

But what is so outrageous, is that this is, at least, contradictory and at worst overt and blatant hypocrisy. According to the Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California’s (PPAC’s) 2006 Legislative score card, Assemblywoman Sally Lieber is “100% pro-choice”*. The main emphasis of the advocates of Roe v. Wade is “pro-choice” or more accurately, pro-abortion, let’s be frank.

It is blatant hypocrisy, that the very same so-called “pro-choice” liberal mindset ignores the premeditated murdering of babies, but will dictate no choice to parents when it comes to spanking.

What about a woman’s right to choose? What about a parent’s right to choose? Women have the right to murder a baby, but no right to spank the same child they could have murdered in the womb; how absurd is this.

It is overt and blatant hypocrisy that the very same liberal mindset ignores their own logic, only to pursue their morally destructive policies, for “we the people”.

By the way, we are not talking about beating—no hypocritical clouding of the real issue.

And just for the record, in general, this writer is not advocating the spanking of children under three. The issue of spanking may be discussed in more detail at a later time.

*Reference: http://www.ppacca.org/site/pp.asp?c=kuJYJeO4F&b=139441

Roe v. Wade-The Other Side:

January 21, 2007

Roe v Wade-The Other Side:
The Decision Dissenting From The “Wrong” Decision of 1973

“MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.

The Court’s opinion brings to the decision of this troubling question both extensive historical fact and a wealth of legal scholarship. While the opinion thus commands my respect, I find myself nonetheless in fundamental disagreement with those parts of it that invalidate the Texas statute in question, and therefore dissent.

I

The Court’s opinion decides that a State may impose virtually no restriction on the performance of abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy. Our previous decisions indicate that a necessary predicate for such an opinion is a plaintiff who was in her first trimester of pregnancy at some time during the pendency of her law-suit. While a party may vindicate his own constitutional rights, he may not seek vindication for the rights of others. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Court’s statement of facts in this case makes clear, however, that the record in no way indicates the presence of such a plaintiff. We know only that plaintiff Roe at the time of filing her complaint was a pregnant woman; for aught that appears in this record, she may have been in her last trimester of pregnancy as of the date the complaint was filed.

Nothing in the Court’s opinion indicates that Texas might not constitutionally apply its proscription of abortion as written to a woman in that stage of pregnancy. Nonetheless, the Court uses her complaint against the Texas statute as a fulcrum for deciding that States may [410 U.S. 113, 172] impose virtually no restrictions on medical abortions performed during the first trimester of pregnancy. In deciding such a hypothetical lawsuit, the Court departs from the longstanding admonition that it should never “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

II

Even if there were a plaintiff in this case capable of litigating the issue which the Court decides, I would reach a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court. I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right of “privacy” is involved in this case. Texas, by the statute here challenged, bars the performance of a medical abortion by a licensed physician on a plaintiff such as Roe. A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is not “private” in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the “privacy” that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

If the Court means by the term “privacy” no more than that the claim of a person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions may be a form of “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no doubt that similar claims have been upheld in our earlier decisions on the basis of that liberty. I agree with the statement of MR. JUSTICE STEWART in his concurring opinion that the “liberty,” against deprivation of which without due process the Fourteenth [410 U.S. 113, 173] Amendment protects, embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights. But that liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid state objective. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly does place a limit, albeit a broad one, on legislative power to enact laws such as this. If the Texas statute were to prohibit an abortion even where the mother’s life is in jeopardy, I have little doubt that such a statute would lack a rational relation to a valid state objective under the test stated in Williamson, supra. But the Court’s sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abortion during the first trimester is impossible to justify under that standard, and the conscious weighing of competing factors that the Court’s opinion apparently substitutes for the established test is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one.

The Court eschews the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in its reliance on the “compelling state interest” test. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179 (1972) (dissenting opinion). But the Court adds a new wrinkle to this test by transposing it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to this case arising under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting of the “compelling state interest test,” the Court’s opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it. [410 U.S. 113, 174]

While the Court’s opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905), the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case. As in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process standards to economic and social welfare legislation, the adoption of the compelling state interest standard will inevitably require this Court to examine the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the very process of deciding whether a particular state interest put forward may or may not be “compelling.” The decision here to break pregnancy into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the State may impose in each one, for example, partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Even today, when society’s views on abortion are changing, the very existence of the debate is evidence that the “right” to an abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would have us believe.

To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment. As early as 1821, the first state law dealing directly with abortion was enacted by the Connecticut Legislature. Conn. Stat., Tit. 22, 14, 16. By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth [410 U.S. 113, 175] Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion. 1 While many States have amended or updated [410 U.S. 113, 176] their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain in effect today. 2 Indeed, the Texas statute struck down today was, as the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 [410 U.S. 113, 177] and “has remained substantially unchanged to the present time.” Ante, at 119. There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this provision or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The only conclusion possible from this history is that the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to this matter.

III

Even if one were to agree that the case that the Court decides were here, and that the enunciation of the substantive constitutional law in the Court’s opinion were proper, the actual disposition of the case by the Court is still difficult to justify. The Texas statute is struck down in toto, even though the Court apparently concedes that at later periods of pregnancy Texas might impose these selfsame statutory limitations on abortion. My understanding of past practice is that a statute found [410 U.S. 113, 178] to be invalid as applied to a particular plaintiff, but not unconstitutional as a whole, is not simply “struck down” but is, instead, declared unconstitutional as applied to the fact situation before the Court. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).

For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.”

–Emphasis Added–

Reference: http://laws.findlaw.com/us/410/113.html

The 34 Year Anniversary of Roe v. Wade

January 20, 2007

The 34 Year Anniversary of Roe v. Wade
January 22, 1973-January 22, 2006

Happy Anniversary America?

What an Anniversary! 1,477,591 Million Abortions Each Year in America
*“United States Abortion Statistics: 47,282,923 Abortions 1973-2005
Reported abortions in the United States, by year 1973 – 2005
–One baby is aborted every 24 seconds
–147 babies are aborted every hour
–3,542 babies are aborted every day
— 24,865 babies are aborted every week
–107,750 babies are aborted every month”
*Reference: http://www.mccl.org/abortion_statistics.htm

Why is America Allowing Premeditated Murder of Innocent Babies? When; *“Americans’ views concerning abortion are:
–73% say abortion should be legal only in some circumstances (53%), or illegal in all circumstances (20%). Harris Interactive, April 2006
–88% favor a law requiring doctors to inform patients about alternatives to abortion. CNN/USA Today / Gallup Poll, January 2003
–78% agree that women who have abortions experience emotional trauma, such as grief and regret. Wirthlin Poll, 1998
–74% believe that abortion should be illegal “when the woman does not want the child for any reason.” Gallup Poll, May 2003”
*Reference: http://www.mccl.org/abortion_statistics.htm

The Answer: The U.S. Supreme Court!
ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) U.S. Supreme Court
410 U.S. 113 Roe Et Al. V. Wade, District Attorney Of Dallas County
Appeal From The United States District Court For The Northern District Of Texas No. 70-18.
Argued December 13, 1971 Reargued October 11, 1972
Decided January 22, 1973
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

*“Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)[1], is a landmark judicial opinion regarding abortion in the United States. According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Roe decision, most laws against abortion violate a constitutional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision overturned all state and federal laws outlawing or restricting abortion that were inconsistent with its holdings. It is one of the most controversial and politically significant cases in U.S. Supreme Court history, and its lesser-known companion case was decided at the same time: Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).[2]

The central holding of Roe v. Wade was that abortions are permissible for any reason a woman chooses, up until the “point at which the fetus becomes ‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”[3] The decision prompted national debate that continues to this day over whether terminating pregnancies should be legal (or more precisely, whether a state can choose to deem the act illegal), the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication, and the role of religious and moral views in the political sphere. Roe v. Wade reshaped national politics, dividing much of the nation into “pro-choice” and “pro-life” camps, and inspiring grassroots activism on both sides.”
*Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roe_v._Wade

Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Amendment XIV (in part)
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Happy Anniversary America?!